Friedman's Velocity?

Picking up from Velocity and Inflation?... another interesting take on "velocity" from Yi Wen and Maria A. Arias at the St. Louis Fed, where they much like Hamilton and Chen, pick at Friedman's equation MV = PQ.

M stands for money. V stands for the velocity of money. P stands for the general price level. Q stands for the quantity of goods and services produced.
According to this view [Friedman's equation], inflation in the U.S. should have been about 31% per year between 2008 and 2013, when the money supply grew at an average pace of 33% per year and output grew at an average pace just below 2%. 
So we know from Hamilton and Chen, and the math above, that increases in money supply do not necessarily correlate with inflation rates, or nominal GDP (output). So why did the monetary base increase not cause a proportionate increase in either the general price level or GDP?
the unprecedented monetary base increase driven by the Fed’s large money injections through its large-scale asset purchase programs has failed to cause at least a one-for-one proportional increase in nominal GDP. Thus, it is precisely the sharp decline in velocity that has offset the sharp increase in money supply, leading to the almost no change in nominal GDP (either P or Q).
QE failed to increase "advertised" consumer inflation and nominal GDP by muting velocity, but why did velocity decline?
the unconventional monetary policy has reinforced the recession by stimulating the private sector’s money demand through pursuing an excessively low interest rate policy (i.e., the zero-interest rate policy).
Indeed "abnormal" monetary policy or "there is something is this more than natural" QE, ZIRP and NIRP pursued to excess do reinforce constrictive conditions, viz a tightening. But how does this  "stimulating the private sector’s money demand " manifest?
"The answer lies in the private sector’s dramatic increase in their willingness to hoard money instead of spend it. Such an unprecedented increase in money demand has slowed down the velocity of money, " 
Again as mentioned in our last missive, important and something we will revisit: "hoard money instead of spend it... increase in money demand has slowed velocity".

Liquidity preferences led to hoarding, which increased demand for money, and caused velocity to tank? Sound's Keynesian, but wait remember what Hamilton and Chin wrote in 2010????
The demand for reserves has increased by a trillion dollars since 2008. The demand for currency held by the public has not. 
So are both Hamilton - Chin and Wen - Arias right? Or is somebody wrong or have they missed something? More important, how might lower velocity or the turnover of money effect the economy?
When there are more transactions being made throughout the economy, velocity increases, and the economy is likely to expand. The opposite is also true: Money velocity decreases when fewer transactions are being made; therefore the economy is likely to shrink.
Take aways? Wen and Arias briefly touch upon something critical in liquidity preferences, hoarding and then transactions velocity or the turnover of money, but go no further down the path. 

We are left with questions, [a conflict between Hamilton-Chen and Wen-Arias] regarding demand for money, did it or did it not increase?  Also regarding the total volume of transactions, more means velocity increases and the economy is likely to expand?  Is this always true? 

At the end of the day, much like Hamilton and Chin, Wen and Arias see the resultant pattern, have grasp of a piece of the puzzle, but for limitations in scope, do not fully address the underlying causes and potential consequence.

More to come in The Irrelevance of Velocity?, stay tuned and no flippin.

Comments

Salmo Trutta said…
It's flow (money actually exchanging counterparties), not stock (e.g., interbank demand deposits), that moves markets.
Salmo Trutta said…
Hello, Hello, Anybody home, Think Marty McFly! Think!

As Professor Lester V. Chandler originally theorized in 1961, viz., that in the beginning: “a shift from demand “total checkable deposits”, to time “savings-investment” accounts involves a decrease in the demand for money balances (Keynes’ liquidity preference curve), and that this shift will be reflected in an offsetting increase in the velocity of money”.

As Scott Sumner erroneously concludes: “Everyone knows that the real demand for money slopes downward, as a function of the nominal interest rates. It’s in all the textbooks.” [which is of course wrong, viz., Alfred Marshall’s “money paradox”]

Chandler’s conjecture was correct up until 1981 – up until the plateau of financial innovation for commercial bank deposit accounts (the sweeping monetization of commercial bank time “savings” deposits).

The saturation of DD Vt according to Marshall D. Ketchum (Chicago School):

Ketchum: “It seems to be quite obvious that over tie the demand for money cannot continue to shift to the left as people buildup their savings deposits; if it did, the time would come when there would be no demand for money at all”.

Thus, as predicted in May 1980, began the secular decline in money velocity (and secular strangulation) as money velocity climaxed in the 1st qtr. 1981, from the “time bomb” (elimination of gate-keeping restrictions on savings deposits), resulting in a 19.1 % 1st qtr. 1981 N-gNp figure:

As proposed in the late 1950’s:

“Savings require prompt utilization if the circuit flow of funds is to be maintained and deflationary effects avoided…The growth of time “savings” deposits shrinks aggregate demand and therefore produces adverse effects on gDp…The stoppage in the flow of funds, which is an inexorable part of time-deposit banking, would tend to have a longer-term debilitating effect on demands, particularly the demands for capital goods.”

The remuneration of IBDDs exacerbates this reversal in the savings-investment process (depending upon the remuneration rate vs. money market wholesale funding rates), i.e., it destroys money velocity.
Salmo Trutta said…
The percent of M1 components to non-m1 components (savings) was .34 percent in July 2016. During the 1990's it rose 52 percent and then reversed in the new millennium.

This demonstrates that bank-held savings are idle and is prima facie evidence of secular strangulation.